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The annual meeting of shareholders has long ceased to be the
routine cut and dry session it was in the early years of this century.
This is as it should be because it is the one day in each year when
employers meet their employees: management and the candidates
for election.1 As the annual proxy statement of the Southern Rail-
ways Company states so well: "The stockholders are invited to at-
tend this annual meeting and to vote in person upon the questions
there submitted. It is the forum provided by the by-laws for general
discussion of the problems of the Company and the management
not only desires, but believes itself entitled to the advice of every
stockholder who is interested in the Company's welfare."
It is fitting that we are witnessing an expanding library of books
in which the annual meeting receives its due. These books show that
the general corporate counsel can play an important role in deter-
mining whether or not the meeting is going to be a successful one
from the collective viewpoints of both management and share-
holders. Like it or not, the corporation lawyer will take the blame
or praise, as the case may be, after the session has ended. Whether
there will be subsequent litigation or proxy contests may be deter-
mined in the conduct of the annual meeting. The trio of books
being reviewed are important, not merely to the counsel for a
corporation but for the young law student, for those who believe in
the development of a people's capitalism and for those who wish to
I Fowler, Meetings: A Change in Climate, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1966, § 3, p. 1,
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take an active part in shaping corporate policies by participating
from the floor in an annual meeting.
Dr. Alexander Rubner, dealing with many aspects of this subject
at American, British and German shareholder sessions in The En-
snared Shareholder, notes how a leading German banker used to
be so contemptuous of differing expressions of opinion that he would
demonstratively read a newspaper when an independent shareholder
rose to speak. This was not only bad manners but a violation of the
principles of Roberts Rules of Order which are a sine qua non for
both management and shareholders if a meeting is to be orderly.
If the chair does not set the example, is it any wonder the share-
holders also grow disorderly? The banker in question, Dr. Rubner
tells us, was not satisfied with this affront to the shareholders. He
also declined to answer questions. The resulting litigation made
German corporate history. The banker had thought himself im-
mune because of the German deposit laws restricting derivative
actions, but how badly he was fooled.2 How new law was made is
described with such gusto by the British author that it would be
a shame to spoil it here, and this reviewer will merely suggest a
reading of page 120 of the volume.
Now if reading newspapers and refusing to answer proper ques-
tions are bad manners, equally so is shareholder conduct described
elsewhere in the Rubner book. The author describes a British
meeting where a distraught shareholder hurled three eggs and one
tomato at the board membersl This obviously is the time when it is
perfectly proper for the Pinkertons to be both seen and heard; not
as in some meetings in the United States when differences over pro-
cedure or the right to ask questions pertaining to the notice of the
meeting (or why it was not presented) have ended in ejections of
the inquisitive shareholder, which tact and adherence to parlia-
mentary law could easily have avoided.3
Commenting on such episodes at American meetings, Dr. Rubner
notes, "I must confess that when I first heard Gilbert's repeated
charges that some American companies deliberately provide no
microphone for shareholders at their Annual General Meetings, or
only one apparatus for an audience of thousands, in order to stifle
opposition speeches, I was more than skeptical. '" 4 After noting a
uRENER, Tm ENSNARED SHAREHOLDER 118-20 (1965).
3L. & J. Gilbert, 26TH ANN. R.EP. OF SHAREuozR ACTIriES 80-33 (1966).
'RUBNER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 122 n.l.
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famous search of shareholders for portable bullhorn megaphones at
one American meeting, he adds that this "and other independent
evidence have persuaded me there indeed is no limit to the childish
and stupid behavior of some directors."5
It is to the importance of shareholder questioning of manage-
ment at the Annual Meeting that Daniel J. Baum and Ned B. Stiles
devote much of their space in The Silent Partners. Mr. Baum, an
associate professor of law at Indiana University School of Law, and
Mr. Stiles, a member of a top-flight New York law firm and formerly
a staff member of the Securities and Exchange Commission, are
eminently qualified to discuss this topic. The importance of ques-
tioning has been the subject of much newspaper comment these
days. "Stockholders have not only the rights but also the responsi-
bilities of ownership .... Stockholders have an obligation to main-
tain a discipline over management without which self-serving
autocracy can readily develop... Voting yes, i.e., goosestepping to
every request by management regardless of intrinsic merit, is just not
desirable. A stockholder should exercise his or her individual
judgment. This is necessary to the maintenance of a viable business
society." Dudley Swim, author of the preceding quotation, is a
director of some large nationally known corporations and is the
chairman of one of them. Donald White, Financial Editor of the
San Francisco Examiner puts it so well when he writes, "The ques-
tion and answer period of the annual meeting is what shareholders
really show up for."
If the small shareholders, not connected with management in
any material way, have increasingly learned the importance of voting
proxies intelligently and asking questions at their annual meetings,
the same cannot be said of "the silent partners," to use the descriptive
term of the second of the books being reviewed here. The authors
indict the institutional investors for failing to be active participants
in the companies in which they are holders.7 Thoughtful people all
over the nation should be asking themselves the same questions
Baum and Stiles pose. The authors easily disprove the pop-
ular myth that stock ownership of public issue corporations by
5 Ibid.Swim, It's Up to You. Monterey, California, Peninsula Herald, Feb. 26, 1966.
'See also "A Study of Mutual Funds," prepared for the Securities & Exchange
Commission by the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce. H.R. REP'. No. 2274,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. 417-25 (1962).
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pension funds, college and state trusts is merely fragmental. True,
as the authors say, individually no one fund or trust is able to hold
more than five per cent of the shares of any company, but in the
aggregate, these five per cents represent a stranglehold of voting
power when proxies are voted blindly "en bloc" for a management
proposal or against an independent one.
Relying solely on management's proxy statements dealing with
the other than day-to-day matters and failing to attend annual meet-
ings will only weaken the entire system of free enterprise. This be-
havior also leaves the floor open to unskilled questioners. The net
result is to give us more "Atlantic Acceptance" situations. And
nothing is more dangerous than asking questions of management
merely in private. An executive can always say what he chooses and
then if things do not work out well he simply says "You misunder-
stood that." When the questions are asked openly on the floor of
the annual meeting, then the same answer has to be furnished all
owners at the same time. This is another reason why independents
and progressive managements alike are insisting, more and more,
on rotation of the annual meeting to assure more active shareholder
participation than would be likely in a Dover, Delaware or a Water-
town, New York. No one has to agree with management's reply,
but it has become a matter of record and should be in the post-
meeting report, as is being done these days by such corporations as
Continental Can, American Tobacco, P. Lorrilard, Xerox and
Chesapeake and Ohio. It is difficult to comprehend how an institu-
tional investor fund of the "silent partners" type can vote against
such a post-meeting report. A fund is paid to and should try to make
public the maximum amount of information, and it is absurd for
them to vote against such proposals just because management may
not want to send one out.
There are many instances of funds being rubber stamps for
management proposals even though it may be in the funds' best
interest to vote against management. These "silent partners" may,
for example, vote against ending stagger systems used to counteract
cumulative voting for directors but then switch their votes when
management is persuaded by enough small shareholders that the
ways of the past should be abandoned. This unquestioning loyalty
to management by the funds makes a strong case for the secret ballot
which has been demanded for so long by Wilma Soss, President of
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the. Federation of Women Shareholders. The secret ballot would
lessen the fears, rightly or wrongly, held by many funds that unless
they vote with management on key issues, management may retaliate.
With the growth of employee-shareholder interest, to say nothing of-
the customer or would-be supplier who may be a small shareholder.
in a company, we have yet another reason for use of the secret ballot.
It is an unfair and undemocratic situation when a management can
apply pressure on the corporation's shareholders.
The authors of the book also deservedly mock the "sell your
stock" thinking of these institutions as being in reality something
which may be quite costly in the long run to the institutional in-
vestor. To realize this we have but to recall the case of one of the
most powerful closed-end trusts in the nation which was actually
the second largest holder in Texas Gulf Sulphur as late as 1962.
It sold its shares at a twenty-six per cent loss on its investment,
and everyone knows of the phenomenal rise in price since then.
Paradoxically this "sell your share" theory actually promotes
proxy contests which might otherwise have been avoided, since
the shares. sold in a company at low prices may bring into the com-
pany those who will be only too glad to engage in a contest or use
the take-over bid variation. It is this which makes so timely the new.
book by Professor Douglas V. Austin, now the chief economist of the-
Cleveland Federal Reserve Bank, entitled Proxy Contests and Cor-
porate Reform, in which he comments: "The owners, often taken for
granted or ignored by management, suddenly take on new impor-
tance when they have the legal right to exercise control over their
investment once again."9 The need for the shareholders "to watch
more carefully for dishonesty or fraud on the part of the top de-
cision makers" is also not overlooked in Professor Austin's tome.
He suggests: "One effective method of preventing the illegal use of
company funds for personal gain is to increase the thoroughness
and independence of external audits. Increased surveillance of
company transactions has developed during the past decade, but the
conclusions of this study imply that further improvement in this
area is needed, especially with regard to transactions involving
personal gains by management at the expense of the stockholders."' 1
This is why the independent shareholder is so insistent that the
8 L & J. Gilbert, 25Tn ANN. REP. OF SHAREHOLDER AcrrvrmEs 195-96 (1965).
SAUSTIN, PROXY CONTE AND CORPOR.ATE REFoRf 79 (1965).
10 d. at 78.
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auditors be present at the annual meeting to answer questions and
further, that the choice of the auditors be ratified by the share-
holders."' How can any "silent partner" vote against this when
independents use a proxy statement to have this practice adopted?
Or, how can they fail to join in the discussion when the auditors
are placed in nomination? This is why independents persist in
asking that items such as this be discussed when being voted upon
and not lumped into any general discussion period at the end of
the meeting. Questions pertaining to auditing, election of direc-
tors, and proposals are entitled to reasonable consideration at the
time they are brought up, as distinct from the subsequent general
question and answer period.' 2
Those corporate managements which adhere to reasonable
equity and equality have far more friendly annual meetings than
those adopting the restrictive alternatives which lead to newspaper
headlines and shareholder irritation which are obviously not in
the best interests of either counsel, management or shareholders
in the opinion of this reviewer.
In airing these many points the distinguished authors have ren-
dered a distinct service not only to corporate democracy and the
making of better corporate citizens, but to all who follow the pattern
of the annual meeting and its role in our free world economy.
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FOUNDATIONS AND GOVERNMENT: STATE AND FEDERAL LAW AND
SUPERVISION. By Marion R. Fremont-Smith.f New York: Russell
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"Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and
have not charity, I am become as sounding brass or a tinkling
cymbal ....
"Charity suffereth long, and is kind; charity envieth not; char-
ity vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up, . ..
"Charity never faileth...
"This is now done by a new high of 1,027 listed corporations. See SEC, 31sr ANN.
RE,. 56 (1965).
12 See How I'd Run an Annual Meeting, Interview with Lewis D. Gilbert. Bus.
Management, 1965.
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